Financial Stability of Islamic and Conventional Banks in Saudi Arabia: Evidence using Pooled and Panel Models by Ghassan, Hassan B. & Taher, Farid B.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Financial Stability of Islamic and
Conventional Banks in Saudi Arabia:
Evidence using Pooled and Panel Models
Hassan B. Ghassan and Farid B. Taher
Umm Al-Qura University, King Faisal University
January 2015
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/92889/
MPRA Paper No. 92889, posted 31 March 2019 04:41 UTC
1 
 
Financial Stability of Islamic and Conventional Banks in Saudi Arabia:  
Evidence using Pooled and Panel Models  
Hassan Belkacem Ghassan    and              Farid Bashir Taher   
The full version is available in the Book “Islamic Finance: Risk, Stability and Growth (Volume 2). Edited by 
Mehmet Asutay and Abdullah Q. Turkistani in Chapter 3: Financial Stability of Islamic and Conventional Banks 
in Saudi Arabia: Evidence Using Pooled and Panel Models. Pages: 81-114. Published by Gerlach-Press and 
available at JStor http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1df4hmj 
 
ABSTRACT 
The financial crises are considered the major challenges facing the prosperity and stability of 
the banking system and menace its stability. Several studies on financial and banking sector 
have demonstrated that Islamic banks have shown more financial robustness and stability 
compared to conventional banks, over periods of financial crises. This research 
aims to measure the stability extent of the Saudi Arabia banks including Islamic banks 
and conventional banks using quarterly data from 2005 to 2011. This period is characterized 
by the global financial crisis shocks (2007-2008). The sample used is composed of six banks 
including two Islamic banks (AlRajhi Bank and AlBilad Bank) and four traditional banks 
(Riyad Bank, Saudi Investment Bank, Saudi British Bank and Saudi American Bank). This 
sample represents an important part of 64% of the Saudi banking sector and covers close to 
two thirds of banks whose shares are traded on the Saudi stock market. The research focuses 
on three types of variables related to bank, banking system and macroeconomic levels. The 
paper is based on quantitative tools using panel regression and pooled regression to model the 
z-score index for testing the banks stability in Saudi Arabia. The panel data model shows that 
Islamic banks reduce relatively the value of the financial stability index; meanwhile, they 
contribute efficiently to enhance the financial stability through the diversification of their 
assets. The findings indicate those Riyad Bank and SAMBA groups support efficiently the 
financial stability of banking sector, while AlRajhi bank has a positive but moderate role in 
enhancing the banking sector stability. The Saudi banking sector has relatively less level of 
competitiveness, that affecting negatively the financial stability. The limited representation of 
Islamic banks in the Saudi banking sector jeopardizes any efforts to improve the financial 
stability index.   
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Key words: Islamic Banks, Financial Crisis, Financial Stability, Z-score Model, Saudi Arabia. 
 
                                                           
Professor, Departmet of Economics, Business School, King Faisal Univesity and Umm Al-Qura University. 
(Corresponding author: hbghassan@yahoo.com)  
 Professor, Departmet of Economics, Business School, King Faisal Univesity. (taher_farid@yahoo.com) 
2 
 
I. Introduction 
Financial crises are strongly related to financial and banking systems, given the international 
financial liberalization market, where a local financial system is no longer isolated from 
changes of the global system. In the last decade of twentieth century Islamic banks were firstly 
established and had growing role in the international financial system since then. In fact, 
CIBAFI (2010) indicates that total world Islamic finance has reached around one trillion U.S. 
dollars at the end of 2009.  
During the last financial crisis (2007-2009) a large number of conventional banks around 
the world have announced bankruptcy (140 U.S. Banks in 2009)1; while no single Islamic bank 
failure has been reported. The logical question to be raised here, is whether Islamic banks are 
immunized against financial shocks? And if so, can this be explained by the free-interest 
system, or by the fact that the Islamic banks do not invest in derivatives, “Tawaruq” and loans 
sale?2 (Chapra, 2000a, 2000b; Siddiqi, 2000; Hassan, 2006). In other word, can the immunity 
of Islamic banks against international financial crises be due to its incomplete integration in 
the global financial system? 
Studying the stability of Islamic banks requires the distinction between banks according to 
its asset structure in its budget. Firstly, Islamic banks adopted single layer Mudarabah, where 
they mobilize their liabilities directly in different investment opportunities. This model was 
faced by a lot of operational risks. Accordingly, Islamic banks switched to the use of multi-
layers Mudarabah Islamic model, i.e., Mudarabah of assets (sources) and liabilities (uses), 
where all assets are financed through Profit Loss Sharing system (PLS). 
The purpose of this paper is to test the hypothesis that Saudi Islamic banks are relatively 
less vulnerable to international financial crises, compared to Saudi conventional banks. The 
financial system and banking system in particular are always threatened by risks which lead to 
financial crises. Banking sector could be major driver of financial crises or one of channels 
transmitting the impacts of crises to other financial sectors and local or international real 
economies. Historical data shows that the banking sector was mostly the heavily damaged party 
by financial crises. During the last international financial crisis, the banks losses in the world 
were estimated to be more than 1.8 trillion dollars, followed by insurance companies with 
                                                           
1 http://www2.fdic.gov/hsob/SelectRpt.asp?EntryTyp=30 
2 The sale of loans is forbidden in Islam even if there are non interest loans.  
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around one trillion dollars. The importance of this paper stems from the perception that the 
stability of Saudi Islamic banks in responses to financial shocks, due to the adoption of the PLS 
system, is expected to contribute positively to the international financial stability. 
II. Nature of financial banks crises  
Since the financial crises of Latin-America and East Asia during the 1990s, international 
organizations have paid more attention to find out the causes and factors leading to the 
international financial crises. These efforts were conducted to elaborate an Early Warning 
System to expect the occurrence of future crises, to take precaution measures to reduce their 
damaging impacts.  
Although each financial crisis has its own features and causes, there are some common 
internal and external features and reasons for all crises. In light of previous studies, the main 
reason behind the possibility of financial crises is asymmetry of information available to 
different participants, concerning rigorous macroeconomic fluctuations, including term of 
trade changes, variability of world interest rates and incentives to the flow of funds, exchange 
rate changes, and the vast expansion of banks credit, followed by a sudden collapse of asset 
prices, causing a miss-match between banks liabilities and assets maturity. In addition, money 
supply was growing at faster rate than GDP. Moreover, financial crises were caused by 
excessive government interventions through banking sector regulation (conflicted objectives 
of government policy and interest groups in banking operations), and the weak accounting and 
legal systems concerning banks objectivity and comprehensive attitude toward exposure and 
dissemination of banks financial standing, as well as the inefficient monitoring and control of 
banks, concerning early corrective actions, and coordination between banks owners, managers, 
and investors, and concerned government agencies. 
Banks financial crises may also happen as a result of changes in exchange rates, through 
banks speculation in FOREX, or the unexpected deterioration of the value of its holding of real 
and financial assets. Central banks are willing, in such cases, to play its role as last resort to 
rescue insolvent banks and to prevent the occurrence of a banking system crisis. Accordingly, 
it is believed that the existence of one of more of the abovementioned factors definitely 
enhances the possibility of a banking sector crisis. An economy, under these circumstances, 
will not be able to accommodate or absorb financial shocks generated by the instability of 
prices, interest rates and exchange rates. It would be difficult for the economy also to resist 
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shocks of liquidity, credit and shocks related to changes in the structure of emerging financial 
institutions, as a result of reassessment of their financial assets, and changes in organizational 
structure or in the demand of assets. Therefore, several financial indices have been developed, 
such an early warning devices, to expect future financial shocks and to moderate its inverse 
financial and economic impacts.  
Banks receive loan applications form investors of different levels of risk and moral 
commitments toward financial deals with banks. Feasibility studies of investor’s project may 
help banks to assess the applicant level of risks, which consequently lessen adverse selection. 
However, such studies do not help bank to avoid moral hazards, which normally happen after 
signing the loan agreement. Furthermore, some loans may involve uncertainty concerning 
investors’ default intention. It is not an easy task for banks to accurately make the distinction 
between these risk levels caused by asymmetric information of banks and investors. 
Financial crises may be an exchange rate crisis, which leads to a large loss of the 
country international reserves, as a result mainly of the local currency devaluation. 
Another type of financial crises is that caused by bank failure, a situation that 
requires central bank interference to provide banks with reserves and to 
restructuring the banking system. Financial crises may also take place as a result of 
debt crisis, when debtors default on bank loans, or even when banks believe that 
defaults become a definite event. Facing such circumstances, banks are expected to 
adopt credit rationing strategy, depriving the economy from any new loans, settling 
outstanding loans. In some cases, the financial crisis may be related to the public 
debt, to Government failure in the repayment of the public debt, raising investment 
risk, discouraging foreign capital inflow, causing an exchange rate crisis. Facing 
such uncertainties, banks charge higher interest rates on loans by adding some risk 
allowance as an insurance premium. However, risky investors are the most likely to 
be willing to pay the high interest rates, given the high rates of returns expected on 
their projects. By contrast, low risk and moderate returns projects may turn to be 
infeasible, given the high financing cost. Accordingly, Banks will be forced to 
finance mainly risky projects, a practice known as adverse selection, which 
endanger the financial stability of the banking sector. 
Moral hazards may also occur as a result of asymmetric information between banks and 
investors with respect to after contracting behavior of the later. Looking for highest possible 
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profits, some investors violate the loan contract by utilizing funds received from banks in rather 
riskier projects than those agreed upon in the contract. Thus, moral hazards raise banks’ risk, 
increase interest on loans, and enhance adverse selection by banks, which all lead to inefficient 
allocation of financial resources and adverse impacts on the economy performance. 
III. Literature review 
There are few papers using quantitative models to analyze the financial stability of the Islamic 
and conventional banks. Čihak and Hesse (2010, 2008) analyze, via z-score as a criterion of 
stability, a sample of twenty countries extracted from the BankScope database, which contain 
the Islamic banks and conventional banks. The Islamic banks are classified into small and large 
banks following their assets-size with a threshold of one billion dollars and having at least 1% 
of the total assets of banks in the country. The findings of Čihak and Hesse indicate that small 
Islamic banks are more stable than small conventional banks and large Islamic banks, large 
conventional banks are more stable than large Islamic banks, and small Islamic banks are more 
stable than Islamic banks are large. They don’t show if the large conventional banks are less 
stable than small Islamic banks. 
The Islamic banks could be affected positively or negatively by financial crisis or banking 
crisis or bankruptcies of conventional banks even if the Islamic banks operate with its assets 
following the Islamic finance. So, Standard & Poor's Credit Rating indicates that the Islamic 
financial institutions satisfy 15% of Muslims needs of financial services, and that the size of 
assets compatible to Islamic-Shariah reaches 400 billion dollars in 2009 i.e. approximately 
10% of international market, which is around 4 trillion dollars. The expansion of the Islamic 
finance model could reduce the immunity of Islamic banks. 
The paper of AlKholi (2009), by using several stability bank indexes, concludes that the 
Saudi Islamic and conventional banks have been supported by SAMA and reflect fragile 
stability. He shows that the Saudi banking sector has successfully absorbed the shocks of 
international financial crisis. This shock absorption increased the customers’ confidence and 
contributed to avoid a local financial crisis and its detrimental repercussion on real economy. 
Saudi banks reserves have been increased by more than three times to face the loan losses, 
SAMA policy and credit rationing by banks reduce significantly the negative effects of the 
international financial crisis on Saudi banks. During the first nine months of 2009, the 
profitability of Saudi banks indicates a tenuous decline around 2.6% (18.86 billion Riyals in 
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2009 versus 19.37 billion Riyals in 2008). At the same time, AlBilad Bank and Saud British 
bank recorded losses respectively at 66% and 11%; the losses of AlBilad Bank would be more 
related to local factors. 
Hasan & Dridi (2010) determine the effects of recent international financial crisis, especially 
during the period (2007-2008), on the conventional and Islamic banks in eight countries, 
including the GCC countries. Using a range of banking indicators such profitability, loan 
growth, asset growth and the external credit rating, they find that Islamic banks have been 
affected by the crisis, but in a different way comparatively to conventional banks. The Islamic 
banks profitability in 2008 reduces the negative impact of the international financial crisis. 
Also, the growth rate of credits and investments assets (loans granted in the PLS system) 
exhibit that the performance of Islamic banks is better than conventional banks, given the large 
losses incurred by conventional banks following the international financial crisis. Then, the 
Islamic banks contribute to realize the financial stability. However, the Islamic banks have 
some weaknesses related to their risk management. In that case, they are exposed to potential 
financial shocks, which require reliable financial instruments to resolve the risk management 
above all liquidity risk. 
The study of Imam and Kpodar (2010) identifies the factors affecting the world expansion 
of Islamic banks, which, in case of success, could be a new alternative financial model for 
finance industry. They use many factors affecting the international spread of Islamic banks 
such rate of Muslim population per country, technology of the domestic financial system, 
competitiveness of the domestic financial system, average of per capita income, real interest 
rate, events of September 11 2001, crude oil price, and integration degree to Middle East 
countries. The findings show that the average of per capita income and the competitiveness in 
the banking system have significant positive impacts on the spread of Islamic banks, expressing 
the increasing need for Islamic financial intermediation across the world. Also, the decrease in 
real interest rates less than 3.5% conducts to more deposits in the Islamic banks. The paper of 
Ariss (2010) focuses on competitiveness conditions of Islamic and conventional banks by using 
several indicators such PR H-statistic index and Lerner index (market power of bank). Using 
yearly data from 2000 to 2006, the findings indicate that the weakness competitiveness is 
related significantly and positively to higher level of profitability, and that traditional banks are 
more competitive than the Islamic banks. Quasi all research uses annual data; our paper by 
using quarterly data contributes to enrich the previous research modeling the financial stability 
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of banks in face of shocks due to financial crises. The panel data features are firstly that the 
sample from 2005 to 2011 represents an important part of 64% of the Saudi banking sector 
with Islamic and conventional banks and covers close to two thirds of banks whose shares are 
traded on the Saudi stock market, and secondly that the sample contains the events of the recent 
global financial crisis (2007-2009). 
IV. Banks Data and tests 
Saudi banking system is composed of a total of eleven banks, including two distinguished 
groups, Islamic and conventional banks (Table 1 and Table 2). Four banks were classified as 
Islamic banks, according to the non-interest financing practice of this group of banks.3 The rest 
seven banks are conventional banks. For the purpose of this paper, a sample of six banks were 
selected, two Islamic banks (AlRajhi and AlBilad banks), and four conventional banks (Riyad 
bank, Saudi Investment bank, Saud British bank, and Saudi American bank), where the last 
two represent offshore banks, with its close links to international banks around the world that 
allow the investigation of the international financial crisis impacts on these banks and on the 
Saudi financial system (see appendix 8.1: panel definitions).  
The stability index (z-score) in sub-annual level is calculated using quarterly data collected 
and constructed from the Saudi financial market “Tadawul” over the period 2005-2011.4 The 
last financial crisis has revealed some weaknesses of the Saudi banking system, on top of which 
are: first, the high concentration of bank loans to a limited number of firms and individuals. 
Second, the large portion of banks’ investment in foreign assets with relatively high rates of 
returns compared to interest rates on domestic assets, especially after lowering the reverse repo 
by SAMA, and the lack of new government bonds during the same period, and the resulted 
liquidity surplus, which were channeled to the international markets (Ghassan et al., 2011).  
The world financial crisis has caused some Saudi banks to encore losses, particularly those 
involved in foreign investment, loans trade, speculation in foreign currency and gold markets, 
and financial derivatives deals. Third, banks showed some degree of credit rationing and 
become relatively more conservative in issuing new loans. On the other hand, Saudi banking 
sector have shown some healthy signs during the financial crisis, where its record profitability 
levels were maintained. Net banks’ profits were declined only by approximately 2.6% after the 
                                                           
3This link “http://www.halal2.com/main.asp?id=71” specifies Islamic and non Islamic features of firms and banks 
registered in Saudi stock market. 
4 The international database BankScope allows only annual financial data.  
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conservative measures taken by banks. Total reserves, voluntarily, boosted to 6.04 billion 
Riyals, over the period January to September 2009, compared with 1.58 billion Riyals a year 
before, as a precautionary action to meet any possible losses due to investors’ defaults on 
banks’ loans. Also, it was noticed that equity capital of Saudi banks have increased, and banks’ 
assets have not suffered the drastic negative impacts that hit banks’ sectors in industrial 
countries around the world, where some giant famous banks were forced to announce 
bankruptcy. Saudi banks’ huge reserves, most likely have shielded domestic banks against the 
tremendous negative impacts of international financial crisis. Moreover, some well-known 
international credit rating agencies as Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s, has reported that basic 
financial forecasts of the Saudi banking sector are relatively stable, flexible and had the ability 
to absorb negative shocks of the international financial crisis and the declining world economic 
growth.   
The prior step is to implement the panel unit root test on the relevant variables given in 
equation (x) below (Descriptive statistics, Tables 3).5 A widely used panel unit root tests are 
Hadri (1999) as a common root test and Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS, 2003) as an individual root 
test. The Hadri test considers the null hypothesis of no unit root and assumes that persistence 
parameters are common i.e. identical in the panel data. Accordingly, it assumes a common 
process of the panel unit root under null hypothesis (ρ
𝑖
=ρ, 𝑖=1, … , 6) considering a following 
process for panel data 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌𝑖 + 𝜂𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 where 𝜀𝑖𝑡is the specific-individual error, 𝑡 stands 
for a time-trend which is related to fixed or individual effects. Similarly, to KPSS test, this test 
depends on the residuals from the individual OLS regressions on constant and time-trend. The 
statistic LM1 is formed allowing for homoscedasticity hypothesis and alternatively the statistic 
ML2 is related to consistent heteroscedasticity assumption, which leads to 𝑍-statistic values 
(Table 4.2). The IPS test considers the null hypothesis of unit root and supposes that the 
persistent coefficient may vary between banks. Accordingly, it assumes an individual process 
of the panel unit root under null hypothesis (ρ
𝑖
=0, 𝑖=1, … , 6) and considering a following 
individual ADF regression for each bank ∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌𝑖𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑗
𝑝𝑖
𝑗=1 ∆𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑗 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛼 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡. The 
average of the t-statistics of ρ
𝑖
 from the individual ADF regressions is adjusted to calculate 𝑡?̅?𝑇 
statistics. When the lag order 𝑝𝑖is non-zero for some cross-sections, the IPS test shows that a 
properly standardized 𝑡?̅?𝑇 i.e. 𝑊?̅?𝑁𝑇statistic fellows asymptotically a standard normal 
                                                           
5 The panel unit test is more sensible to high autocorrelation, which involves appropriate lag length in the test 
equation. The Hadri test has a different procedure for choosing the lag length; it requires the choice of kernel 
method estimation and bandwidth method to weighting the auto-covariances by selecting the small ones.  
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distribution (Table 4.1). The results of unit root panel test indicate that banks’ variables have 
unit root using either IPS or Hadri test. This finding suggests that the bank’s variables would 
be cointegrated. Also, the results of unit root tests exhibit that banking sector and 
macroeconomic variables are no stationary except the economic growth variable. 
V. Stability index Model 
5.1 Banks Financial Stability Measurement 
There are several well-known methods measuring the stability of financial systems, and 
banking sector in particular. Among these methods, Value at Risk (VaR) (Holton, 2003, 
Manganelli & Engle, 2001), Stress Test (Aragonés et al., 2001; BIS, 2000) and z-score model 
(Altman, 1983). This model is considered the best amongst all other methods, as it has the 
advantage of predicting the possibilities of future bank insolvency, while other methods just 
find out if the bank may face a liquidity problem.   
In fact, insolvency is more serious and dangerous problem than liquidity, which means that 
the bank liabilities exceed its assets, or the bank become insolvent. A bank may become illiquid 
even when it is solvent, if its assets are held in illiquid assets (long term financial assets or real 
assets) that can only be liquidated at high cost. The bank may be forced to sell such assets at 
considerable loss, by selling it at lower than its nominal value. 
Altman measure can be applied to conventional and Islamic banks as well, using banks’ 
accounting data. The z-score for banks takes the following definitions: 
                                                                𝑧 =
𝑘𝑡:𝑞+𝜇𝑡:𝑞
𝜎𝑡:𝑞
                                                              (1) 
                  𝑘𝑡:𝑞 = (
𝐸
𝐴
)
𝑡:𝑞
,  𝜇1,𝑡:𝑞 = (
𝑅𝑡:𝑞
𝐴𝑡:𝑞
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
   or    𝜇2,𝑡:𝑞 =
?̅?𝑡:𝑞
?̅?𝑡:𝑞
  ,    𝜎2 = 𝑉 (
𝑅
𝐴
)
𝑡:𝑞
                    (2) 
where 𝑘 is the ratio of equity capital plus total reserves to assets. μ represents the ratio of 
average returns to assets, where average returns are calculated on base of four observations per 
year; we use the first formula. σ stands for the standard deviation of returns to assets, and 
measures the volatility of returns on assets.6 The z-score bank’s stability index is used for 
predicting financial distress. It is based on a standard indicator of financial soundness of a 
                                                           
6 Strobel (2010) shows that the best measure of standard deviation require high frequency such the branch banks 
data.   
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group of different financial institutions, and focuses on bank’s risk of insolvency.7 The z-score 
reflects the probability of insolvency or bank liabilities exceed assets. Assuming a normally 
distributed bank return μ, then the probability of default is 𝑝(μ < −𝑘) = ∫ N(0,1)dμ
z
−∞
. The z-
score measures the number of standard deviations that a return realization has to fall in order 
to deplete equity (Čihak, 2007). The greater z-score indicates the lower likelihood of bank 
insolvency risk; the index will take high value when capitalization, measured in terms of risk 
error, is large.  
The z-score seems to be appropriate to measure the Islamic bank risk, because it is not 
affected by the nature of the bank activities; but it focuses on risks involved in the investment 
of bank assets and reserves. It is especially suitable for banks adopting investment strategies 
that prefer high risk assets given a high rate of return, or low risk assets even at low rate of 
returns, which guarantees the z-score objectivity (Čihak & Hesse, 2010, 2008; Maechler et al., 
2005). But in the context of financial shocks and crises the high risk may lead to meager or 
negative returns, whilst the small risks may turn to big returns. These volatilities require a 
specific modeling of z-score index to explain its determinants in the long run such the GARCH 
models.  
The z-score index may be incompatible with the nature of Islamic banking relying mainly 
on the PLS system, which leads to a common risk of the investor and bank via “Mudarabah” 
and “Musharakah” contracts. It is probable that the capital value and reserves do not reflect the 
financial strength of Islamic banks, because the investor shall bear a part of the risk according 
to a formula of PLS contracts, and thus reduce fairly the risk of Islamic Banks. These banks 
may seek for adjustments processes in risk-taking rates by the investors through appropriate 
contracts of PLS system and new methods of capital investment. The conventional banks also 
seek for adjustment processes of interest rates on deposits and loans to avoid insolvency (Čihak 
& Hesse, 2010, 2008). 
                                                           
7 In fact, insolvency is more serious and dangerous problem than liquidity, which means that the bank liabilities 
exceed its assets, or the bank become insolvent. A bank may become illiquid even when it is solvent, if its assets 
are held in illiquid assets (long term financial assets or real assets) that can only be liquidated at high cost. The 
bank may be forced to sell such assets at considerable loss, by selling it at lower than its nominal value. The 
concept of financial distress, widely used to make financial analysis of banks data, indicates the negative 
performance of banks. The case of financial distress occurs when the bank becomes insolvent even if bank assets 
exceed its liabilities. While the concept of economic failure shows that the return rate of investments is less than 
the interest rate on short loans. Also, the financial failure happens when the enterprise is unable to pay its debts 
and short-term obligations. The bankruptcy indicates the inability of a company to pay its debts and short-term 
obligations and the difficulty to manage their financial needs from external funding sources.   
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5.2 Financial Stability Model 
The financial stability index is influenced by three sets of variables related to banks, banking 
sector and macroeconomic, respectively. The bank determinants include five variables: 
logarithm of z-score (LZSCOR), logarithm of total assets (LAST), loans to assets ratio for 
conventional banks or ratio of finance activity to assets in case of Islamic banks (ratio of credits 
to assets, RCA),8 in addition to ratio of operating costs to income (RCI) and income diversity 
(IDV).les: logarithm of Herfindahl The banking sector determinants include three variab9 
index (LHHI), which measures banks’ competitiveness, that ranges between zero for highly 
competitive and 10000 for a least competitive market (Ariss, 2010). It also includes the share 
of Islamic banks i.e. ratio of Islamic banks’ assets to total assets of the banking sector (SHIB), 
which may also be measured by the ratio of Islamic banks’ deposits to total bank sector 
deposits. The macro variables are both real rate of economic growth (GRW) and rate of 
inflation (INF).   
To capture the impacts of a specific bank on financial banking stability, two bank dummy 
variables were introduced one for conventional banks (CBD) and the other for Islamic banks 
(IBD). These variables are expected to take on a negative sign indicating the financial weakness 
of the related bank group, whereas a positive sign reflecting the financial strength of the related 
bank group and its contribution to the banking sector stability. It is also possible to use a 
composed variable in testing the hypothesis that the Islamic banks contribute to the financial 
stability of banking sector. The IDV variable interacts with both dummy variables IBD and 
CBD. If the interaction with IBD takes on a positive sign, it implies that the diversity of Islamic 
bank’s income enhances the stability of the banking sector. 
Given that the cross-section observations are less than the time series observations (𝑁 <
𝑇), and assuming the existence of serial correlation between banks’ data, the unobserved 
random errors are expected to have variance covariance matrix Ω ⊗ 𝑇, with Ω = (𝜎𝑖𝑗), 𝑖, 𝑗 =
1, … , 𝑁 where 𝜎𝑖𝑗 is not necessarily equal zero (Heij et al. 2004). These features require using 
                                                           
8 Instead of interest income (commissions) and interest charges in conventional banks, we use for Islamic banks 
finance income and finance charges.  
9 To calculate the income diversity, we use the following definition:  
𝑖𝑑𝑣 = 1 − |𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒−𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑔 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
| where the net interest income, for Islamic banks, includes 
positive and negative income flows related to many model of PLS system. The higher value of this index indicates 
a higher diversification of income.   
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a Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) model, which leads to formulate a pooled data model 
and use of several estimation techniques of z-score model.10  
Based on the previous determinants of financial stability, the z-score model could be written 
as follows:   
                             𝑧𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝐵𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑖𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝜔𝑖𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝜋𝑖𝐷𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                           (3) 
where 𝐵𝑖𝑡−1 stands for banks variables, 𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 and 𝑀𝑖,𝑡 represent banking sector and 
macroeconomic variables, respectively. We use also 𝐷𝑖 as dummy variable to exhibit to 
distinguish between the impacts of conventional and Islamic banks on the financial distress on 
bank 𝑖. The term 𝜀𝑖𝑡 indicates the unobserved stochastic errors. The variables in right side of 
Eq. (3) are considered with one lag length to capture their effects on the expected z-score index.   
Considering that the sum of cross fixed effects is zero (bottom of Tables 5), these effects 
appear in Figures 3 and represent the deviations from the global rate of z-score. The findings 
show that SIB, SAB banks and mainly BLD bank contribute positively to financial stability, 
whereas SAM and RJH banks and mostly RYD bank contribute negatively to financial index 
stability. To exhibit the global effect on banking sector, we formulate a Panel data model and 
using also numerous estimation methods:11  
                            𝑧𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝐵𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝜔𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝜋𝐷𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                      (4) 
The findings indicate that Islamic banks reduce the financial stability index in the average rate 
of 11.4% (Table 7.1). But they contribute to the financial stability in banking sector through 
the income diversity index, which improves the z-score on average at rate 21.6%. The serial 
correlation due to the dummy variable (IBD) relativizes these results.      
The results of the Table 7.3 have some goodness statistical features, they show that Islamic 
banks contribute to improving financial stability in average with rate of 8.3% (i.e. 0.306
3.742
) through 
the diversification of financial products. The results of Table 8.2 from Panel GLS estimation 
                                                           
10 Such the Pooled Least Square (PLS) method, without cross-section weights and using standard errors and 
covariances; the Generalized Pooled Least Squares (PGLS) method, with cross-section weights (correcting for 
both cross-section heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous correlation) and using SUR errors and covariances; 
the P2GLS method, with cross-section weights and using SUR errors and covariances, and set of common, cross-
section specific and period specific instrumental variables.   
11 Obviously, when we consider panel banks, the fixed effects are less appropriate than the stochastic effects, but 
the small number of banks in our sample does not authorize such hypothesis.     
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indicate that fixed cross effects on z-score vary between banks. AlBilad bank contributes 
negatively to z-score more than SAIB and in particular comparatively to the negative 
contribution of SABB (1.5% on average). Meanwhile Riyad Bank contributes efficiently to 
banking financial stability, SAMBA group enhances this stability significantly, and AlRajhi 
Bank has a slightly positive contribution (1.1% on average). 
The Table 7.3 indicates that the index of operating cost to income has almost neutral role 
in improving the financial stability index, so it is reduced slightly at rate 0.01%. But, AlBilad 
bank has a high and unstable ratio of cost to income, while AlRajhi Bank proved to be highly 
competitive over to Riyad Bank. This ratio appears to be more unstable and less competitive in 
both SAIB and SABB. It appears from Table 7.3 that the variables of banks have the expected 
signs, as the banks that have a high level of RCA variable moves toward low index of financial 
stability (Table 8.2), such as AlBilad Bank in particular and SAIB. But, it seems that the 
marginal propensity (0.622) associated to the ratio of loans to assets (for conventional banks) 
or to the ratio of finance to assets (for Islamic banks) has a significant positive sign, which 
emphasizes the effects of banks with moderate RCA ratios.  
The modest presence of Islamic banks in the Saudi banking sector does not qualify them to 
improve effectively the banking financial stability. The dominance of conventional banks 
reflects that they contribute to increase the z-score index, although some financial distress as 
in SAIB and SABB. But, the presence of Islamic banks leads to net improvement of the 
financial stability, so that the fixed cross effects (Table 5.3) exhibit that AlBilad bank, with 
small size compared to AlRajhi Bank, gets better the z-score index, while AlRajhi bank tends 
to reduce the Islamic financial stability index. These results may be explained by the 
involvement of AlRajhi bank, through the Profit-Loss Sharing system, in direct investment 
operations or long run and high risk financial investment intermediation. These results are 
similar in part to the findings of Čihak and Hesse (2010, 2008), that the small Islamic banks 
are more stable than the large ones. 
It seems that the impact of competitive banks index LHHI has a negative sign and high 
significant parameter, which indicates that the Saudi banking sector relatively complains of 
weak competition, reflecting negative effects on financial stability. In addition, the estimated 
equations exhibit that the inflation rate affects negatively and significantly the z-score index, 
which illustrates the importance of economic and financial policies of the government in 
support of the financial stability in banking system.  
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VI. Conclusion  
The paper uses the z-score as financial distress index of sample of Saudi banks including 
conventional and Islamic banks. The financial stability model is explained by variables reliable 
to individual banks, banking sector and macroeconomic. The models are designed for both 
pooled and panel data and estimated by several methods, the findings may be summarized as 
follows.  
Pooled data model shows that SAIB and SABB and mainly AlBilad bank contribute 
positively to its financial stability index, while SAMBA group, AlRajhi Bank and in particular 
Riyad bank have a negative impact on its financial stability index. However, panel data model 
shows that Islamic banks reduce relatively the value of the financial stability index; meanwhile, 
they contribute efficiently to enhance the financial stability through the diversification of their 
assets. The fixed cross effects on z-score indicate that AlBilad Bank had the greatest negative 
contribution to the financial stability index, followed by SAIB and the SABB, this latter has 
the least negative impact on z-score. Results also show that Riyad Bank and SAMBA group 
efficiently support the financial stability of banking sector, while AlRajhi bank has a positive 
but relatively moderate role in enhancing the banking sector stability.   
The findings indicate that the ratio of operating cost to income has almost neutral role in 
improving the financial stability index. AlBilad Bank has a high and unstable ratio of cost to 
income, while AlRajhi Bank proved to be highly competitive over to Riyad Bank. This ratio 
appears to be more unstable and less competitive in both SAIB and SABB. Conventional banks 
with high ratio of loans to assets or Islamic banks with high finance to assets ratio mostly have 
lower stability indices, as for instance AlBilad bank and SAIB. However, this ratio has a 
positive and significant marginal propensity, which emphasizes the effects of banks with 
moderate ratios. The competitiveness index seems to be negatively high and strongly 
significant, which indicates that the Saudi banking sector has relatively less level of 
competitiveness, that negatively affecting the financial stability. The limited representation of 
Islamic banks in the Saudi banking sector jeopardizes any efforts to improve the financial 
stability index. 
15 
 
References 
AlKholi, H. (2009). Impact of Financial Crisis on Banking Sector. [Online] Available from: 
http://www.iifef.org/node/1154 [Accessed 4th March 2013].  
Altman, E. (1983).Corporate Financial Distress. John Willey & Sons Inc., New York. 
Aragonés, J. R., C. Blanco, and Dowd, K. (2001). “Incorporating Stress Tests into Market Risk 
Modeling”, Derivatives Quarterly, Spring, 44-49. 
Ariss, T. R. (2010). “Competitive conditions in Islamic and conventional banking: a global 
perspective”, Review of Financial Economics, 19, 101-108. 
Bank for International Settlements, BIS (2000). Stress Testing by Large Financial Institutions: 
Current Practices and Aggregation Issues. Basel, Switzerland: Committee on the Global 
Financial System, April. 
CIBAFI, (2010). Principles of Financial Moderation, Ten Principles for Creating a Balanced 
and Just Financial and Banking System. Comprehensive Summary.  
Chapra, M. U. (2000a). “Why has Islam Prohibited Interest? Rationale behind the Prohibition 
of Interest”, Review of Islamic Economics, 9, 5-20. 
Chapra, M. U. and Khan, T. (2000b). Regulation and Supervision of Islamic Banks. Occasional 
Paper 3, IDB, IRTI, 1-109. 
Čihak, M. and Hesse, H. (2010). “Islamic banks and financial stability: An empirical analysis”, 
Journal of Financial Services Research, 38 (2), 95-113. 
Čihak, M. and Hesse, H. (2008). Islamic Banks and Financial Stability: An Empirical Analysis. 
International Monetary Fund, Working Paper WP/08/16, January, 1-29.   
Čihak, M. (2007). “Systemic Loss: A Measure of Financial Stability”, Czech Journal of 
Economics and Finance, 57(1-2), 5-26. 
Hadri, K. (1999). Testing the Null Hypothesis of Stationarity against the Alternative of a Unit 
Root in Panel Data with Serially Correlated Errors. Manuscript. Department of Economics 
and Accounting, University of Liverpool, 1999. 
16 
 
Hadri, K. (2000). “Testing for Stationarity in Heterogeneous Panel Data”, Econometric 
Journal, 3,148–161. 
Hasan, M. and Dridi, J. (2010). The effects of the Global Crisis on Islamic Banks and 
Conventional Banks: A Comparative Study. International Monetary Fund Working Paper 
10/201. 
Hassan, M. Kabir (2006). “The X-Efficiency in Islamic Banks”, Islamic Economic Studies, 
13(2), 49-78. 
Ghassan, B. H., F. B. Taher, and Adhailan, S. S. (2011). “The impacts of International Financial 
Crisis on Saudi Arabia Economy: SVAR model”, Islamic Economic Studies, 17(2), 1-34.  
Heij, Ch., P. de Boer, P. H. Franses, T. Kloek, and Van Dijk, H. K. (2004). Econometric 
Methods with Applications in Business and Economics. First edition, Oxford University Press. 
ISBN 0–19–926801–03579108642. 
Holton, G. A. (2003). Value at Risk: Theory and Practice. Academic Press, USA. 
Im, K. S., Pesaran, M. H. and Shin, Y. (2003). “Testing for Unit Roots in Heterogeneous 
Panel”, Journal of Econometrics, 115, 53-74. 
Imam, P. and Kpodar, K. (2010). Islamic Banking: How it is diffused? International Monetary 
Fund Working Paper 10/195. 
Maechler, A., Mitra, S. and Worrell, D. (2005). Exploring Financial Risks and Vulnerabilities 
in New and Potential EU member States. Second Annual DG Oct. 6-7, ECFIN Research 
Conference.  
Manganelli, S. and Engle, R. F. (2001). Value at Risk Models in Finance. ECB Working Paper 
Series 75, August, 1-40.   
Strobel, F. (2010). “Bank insolvency risk and aggregate Z-score measures: a caveat”, 
Economics Bulletin, 30(4), 2576-2578.  
Siddiqi, M. N. (2000). “Islamic Banks: Concept, Percept and Prospects”, Review of Islamic 
Economics, 9, 21-36. 
17 
 
Annex 
1. Banks identity  
Riyad Bank (RYD) is a Saudi Joint Stock Company founded in 1957. It operates with 237 
branches, a branch in London (UK), and an agency in Houston (USA) and a representative 
office in Singapore. The RYD provides a full range of banking and investment services. It also 
provides to its customers’ non-interest based banking products approved and supervised by an 
independent Shariah Board established by RYD. 
Saudi Investment Bank, SAIB (SIB) founded in 1976 and owned by the government. It 
operates with 45 branches, which 41 work under the Alasalah Brand. SAIB provides a full 
range of traditional wholesale, retail and commercial banking products and services in 
particular for the quasi-government and private industrial sectors including trade finance 
products for both imports and exports. Through Alasalah Islamic Banking brand, SAIB offers 
several Shariah-compliant products and services.  
Saudi British Bank, SABB (SAB) is a Saudi Joint-Stock company founded in 1978 and 
licensed to conduct banking business. SABB has a very strong and rich record in banking 
business as well as a successful history in Saudi Arabia in the launch and provision of banking 
services and products for retail and corporate customers. SABB is one of the first banks to issue 
the credit cards in the Saudi Market, use ATMs for equity subscription services, in addition to 
the use of Braille language in ATMs and the financing and support of MBA scholarship 
program at UK universities for Saudi citizens.  
Samba Financial Group (SAMBA, SAM) founded in 1980 and enjoys an extensive 
network of branches in Saudi Arabia as well as in UK, Pakistan and Dubai. The SAMBA adopts 
a strategy of expansion in the regional markets and provides world class services to meet the 
financial needs of its private, corporate and institutional customers. Its strong suite of 
comprehensive and integrated conventional and Shariah-compliant financial products and 
services as well as financial advisory services has propelled Samba to the top tier of Saudi 
Financial institutions. The Bank aims to invest in its staff, reinforce its social responsibility and 
maximize its shareholders’ returns. SAMBA was the first Bank in Saudi Arabia to offer Priority 
Banking (Gold and Diamond), Phone Banking, ATMs and Cash Deposit through ATMs, Debit 
Cards, Charge Cards, Islamic Credit Cards, Co-Branded Credit Cards, AlKhair Credit Cards 
for ladies, “Murabaha”-Based Cash Financing, Phone Banking, Leasing (“Ijarah”), Foreign 
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Exchange Derivatives, Interest Rate Derivatives, Credit Shield Insurance, and Automated 
Signature Verification.  
AlRajhi Bank (RJH) founded in 1976 and considered as one of the largest banking 
corporations in Saudi Arabia with a Saudi fully paid capital. RJH has the largest branch 
network (more than 500 branches) and the largest (ATM) network (2000 machines) and over 
17,000 (POS) installed with merchants all over the Kingdom. The objectives of RJH are 
represented in practicing banking and investment activities respecting Islamic law. RJH is 
practicing banking and investment (individuals, companies) for its own account or on behalf 
of others within and outside the Kingdom. 
AlBilad Bank (BLD) is a Saudi joint stock company founded in 2005. The objectives of 
BLD are to provide all Islamic Shariah compliant banking services. The bank has, as part of 
its organizational structure, Shariah Department to be in charge of the follow-up and 
monitoring of the implementation of the Shariah decisions issued by the Shariah Committee.  
 
2. Tables and Figures 
 Table 1: Banks Listed in the Saudi Stock Exchange (2012) 
  Source : http://www.tadawul.com.sa (2012). IW stands for Islamic windows. 
 
      
   
Bank Code Bank type Capital (Billion SAR) 
1. Riyad Bank RYD Conventional with IW 15.0 
2. Al-Jazirah JZR Islamic 03.0 
3. Saudi Investment Bank SIB Conventional with IW 04.5 
4. Saudi Hollandi Bank SHD Conventional 03.3 
5. Saudi Fransi Bank SAF Conventional with IW 07.2 
6. Saudi British Bank (SABB) SAB Conventional with IW 07.5 
7. Arab National ARN Conventional with IW 06.5 
8. Saudi American Bank (SAMBA) SAM Conventional with IW 09.0 
9. AlRajhi Bank RJH Islamic 15.0 
10. AlBilad Bank BLD Islamic 03.0 
11. AlInma Bank IMA Islamic 15.0 
19 
 
     Table 2: Main Differences between Islamic and Conventional Banks 
 Conventional Banks  Islamic Banks  
Model 
Based on conventional law, 
Maximize profits subject to 
differential interest rates. 
Based on Islamic law (Shariah), 
Maximize profits subject to Profit-Loss 
Sharing (PLS) System. 
Risk 
 Shifting risk when involved or 
expected. 
 Guarantee all its deposits. 
 Focus on credit-worthiness of 
the clients. 
 
 
 Bearing risks when involved in any 
transaction. 
 Guarantee only current account 
deposits, but other deposits are 
invested via multilayer Mudarabah 
system as a part of PLS system. 
 Focus on the viability of the 
projects. 
Money and 
liquidity 
 Interests on borrowing from the 
any market.  
 Sale of Debts. 
 Based on Shariah-compliant for 
any transaction.  
 Large restrictions on sale of Debts. 
 
 
